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I. Executive Summary  
 
 Pay for success (PFS) and social impact bonds (SIBs) are finance mechanisms by  
 
which governments can reduce costs and expand evidence-based programs. In these  
 
structures, investors front capital to nonprofit service providers for services to reduce  
 
costly social problems. Governments looking to gain monetary savings for preventative  
 
programs are interested in having private investors front this capital primarily as a cost  
 
saving mechanism. Anticipated cost savings are tied directly tied to program outcomes  
 
which lend SIBs to work well for policy priorities and identified costs that can be  
 
reduced. If the program delivers on predetermined outcomes at the end of a determined  
 
period, governments will return the investment amount plus a small rate of return to the  
 
investors.  
 
 State and local governments are beginning to look at addressing several maternal  
 
and child health issues through these mechanisms. This model is attractive because  
 
it provides cost savings to governments and expands evidence based programs. However,  
 
the success of these multi-stakeholder partnerships will depend on the details of each  
 
contract and the capacity of nonprofits providing the services. Ethical issues particularly  
 
on the investor side will need to be carefully considered. Furthermore, the outcomes  
 
targeted by programs will need to be clearly defined and measurable.  
 
 Programs best matched to utilize this new type of finance model are those that  
 
have been in existence for more than five years and have rigorous evaluations showing  
 
statistically significant results. Social impact bonds have the potential to improve  
 
maternal and child health outcomes, however these expensive and complex partnerships  
 
should be evaluated carefully. More innovative versions of this model are likely to  
 
develop and may be used by state and local governments to improve health outcomes.  
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II. Introduction  
 
“At its core, this [pay for success] construct has the potential to leverage private-public  
 
partnerships to transform the way state and local governments finance social programs in  
 
this country.” 1 
 
            Impact investing is a rapidly emerging concept. It merits the attention of  
 
governments, foundations, practitioners, funders, researchers, program developers, and  
 
policy makers. In this field, wealth holders seek to put forward capital with the hope of  
 
gaining both a return on their investment and improving a social outcome. The New York  
 
Times writer Paul Sullivan refers to impact investing as the “hybrid between philanthropy  
 
and private equity.”2 While philanthropy has long invested in innovative solutions to  
 
social problems, it can no longer be the sole source funding innovation. Innovation needs  
 
philanthropy and one could argue that philanthropy must now marry innovation and  
 
private equity. 
 
 The basic definition of impact investing involves combining the aim to solve a  
 
social or environmental challenge while generating a financial profit.3 This type of  
 
funding is different from a loan or grant in that it seeks to deliver both measurable impact  
 
and profit. Unlike a grant that is contingent on delivering a particular program, impact  
 
invested capital earns a profit while addressing a social or environmental need. As Kippy  
 
Joseph stated, “social and environmental conditions will require more capital than public  
 
dollars, philanthropy, and civil society can provide. With the emergence of the field of  
 
impact investing, the marketplace now has viable opportunities to join government and  
 
philanthropy to finance capital-intensive social initiatives.” 4 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Social impact bonds (SIBs) and pay for success (PFS) are hot topics in the impact  
 
investing world. These two terms are being used in many policy, practitioner, nonprofit,  
 
media, government, and philanthropy sectors. SIBs and PFS are manifestations of a type  
 
of impact investing. The paper’s aim is to examine this nascent financial model  
 
from the viewpoint of the maternal and child health field and to seek to identify whether  
 
SIBs or PFS may be a more effective means of allocating resources to improve health  
 
outcomes.  This paper proceeds as follows. First, the need for new financial mechanisms  
 
will be reviewed. Secondly, the mechanics of SIBs and the players and their roles will be  
 
addressed. Examples of PFS constructed to improve maternal and child outcomes are  
 
reviewed. Finally, the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of SIBs are  
 
explored.  
 
“Public Health is the science and the art of preventing disease, prolonging life and  
 
promoting health through the organized efforts and informed choices of society,  
 
organizations, public and private, communities and individuals.” 5 
 
 One must first orient oneself to two key concepts before exploring SIBs: life  
 
course theory and public health prevention. Nearly ten years after the publication of  
 
Michael Lu and Neal Halfon’s landmark article exploring MCH Life Course theory, a  
 
recent issue of Maternal and Child Health highlighted the importance of this theory in  
 
reigniting the work of the MCH field. While the field has begun to explore life course  
 
theory, there is a need to move from theory into the “actual practice of life course.” It is  
 
particularly salient that a 1960 quote from Pauline Stitt of the Children’s Bureau is used  
 
to serve as a reminder that life course has long been a focus within the field:  
 
“MCH does not raise children, it raises adults. All of tomorrow’s productive, mature  
 
citizens are located someplace along the MCH continuum.” 6  
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 Prevention is the core of public health. It is more than the foundation; prevention  
 
pulses at the center of the field’s work, as both an art and a science. The life course  
 
perspective is a useful framework because it underscores the need to improve outcomes  
 
at younger ages that will provide lasting benefits. Life course theory and prevention  
 
woven together provide a universal need to ensure the health of the population and  
 
allocate resources effectively.  
 
The need for preventative programs that improve life course outcomes and the  
 
health of the nation could not be more imperative.  Public health issues facing the United  
 
States are significant. The United States continues to struggle with an array of social and  
 
health challenges that must be met in order to ensure a productive and globally  
 
competitive work force. These problems come at significant social and economic costs to  
 
individuals and society. For example, although teen pregnancy rates have declined in  
 
recent years, it is estimated in 2010 teen pregnancy and childbirth resulted in nearly $9.4  
 
billion in costs to taxpayers for health care, foster care, incarceration rates among  
 
children of teen parents, and lost tax revenue because of lower educational attainment  
 
among teen mothers.7 Looking at perinatal health, nearly one in eight babies born each  
 
year is born preterm. Preterm birth is also a significant cost to the healthcare system- as  
 
much as $26 billion in 2005.8 Obesity is an additional significant public health issue  
 
threatening the health and productivity of the future US workforce. Some calculations  
 
estimate obesity related costs to account for as much as 21% of medical spending, or  
 
about $190 billion in 2005.9 A strong commitment is needed to address these challenges  
 
while expanding preventative services and improving life course trajectories.  
 
 
 
 
 5 
III. The Need for Innovative Financing Methods 
 
Resources to address public health challenges are limited. Specifically, financial  
 
resources in the public government sector and the nonprofit sector are increasingly  
 
limited. Automatic spending cuts as seen in the 2013 budget sequestration illustrate the  
 
reduction in public spending. Additional proposed policies aim to reduce discretionary  
 
spending, and there is a general consensus that current US health care spending rates are  
 
unsustainable and fail to deliver quality outcomes. Many states struggle to effectively  
 
manage their budgets and address increasing needs.  
 
While these public sector financial difficulties are debated, and solutions are  
 
proposed, the nonprofit sector must play an important role to improve public health  
 
outcomes. The need for the nonprofit sector grows out of the limitations of the public and  
 
private sectors. While public sector initiatives can finance programs that are not  
 
profitable, the private sector is unable to respond to needs that are not accompanied by a  
 
demand for money. The nonprofit sector fills gaps in services the public sector cannot   
 
finance and the private sector is unable to address. Although, increasingly government  
 
agencies are contracting with nonprofit organizations to provide needed services.  
  
 Nonprofit organizations have their own unique set of funding challenges. Several  
 
factors contribute to what some term the “nonprofit starvation cycle.” 10 Over time,  
 
funders expect nonprofits to do more with less and are not inclined to devote funds  
 
towards overhead costs.10 Project funding is often awarded on a short term time span  
 
(such as a year) rather than a long term horizon investment that can be relied upon for  
 
multiple years. Furthermore, a significant issue facing nonprofits is the lack of funding in  
 
the block grant form which can allow for service development and provision.11 Short  
 
time frames and unrealistic expectations perpetuate the cycle where funders and  
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nonprofits are not honest about realistic costs.  
 
Funding is often easily susceptible to budget shortfalls. The philanthropic world  
 
often operates on short time frames which make it difficult for programs to forecast more  
 
than a year or two into the future. Indeed, according to the results of the 2013 State of the  
 
Nonprofit Sector Survey, 42% of survey respondents report that they do not have the  
 
right mix of financial resources to thrive and be effective in the next 3 years.12 As the  
 
CEO of Nonprofit Finance Fund, Antony Bugg-Levine, remarked “Nonprofits are  
 
changing the way they do business because they have to: government funding is not  
 
returning to pre-recession levels, philanthropic dollars are limited, and demand for  
 
critical services has climbed dramatically.” 12  
 
In addition, as the number of NPOs increase, there is intra-sector competition for  
 
donors.11 The same pool of money is now being spread among an increasing number  
 
of nonprofits. NPOs can acquire funds through earned income, government support, and  
 
private donations. Yet, nonprofits alone cannot have the large scale impact many aim for.  
 
Recent data from Giving USA highlights the relatively small participation of foundations.   
 
American’s donated approximately $316 billion to charitable causes in 2012.13 
 
Individuals donated 72%, foundations 15%, and corporations 6%.13 
 
While the public and nonprofit sectors fund projects and initiatives to move the  
 
needle on many maternal and child health issues, progress is often too slow, especially in  
 
areas where interventions have been proven successful. For example, home visiting  
 
programs have been shown to have positive effects on prenatal health, reducing  
 
childhood injuries, increased maternal employment, fewer subsequent pregnancies, and  
 
improved school readiness for the child. The Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP) is one  
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example. The program has been through three randomized control trials; yet, similar to  
 
other home visiting programs, it has not reached a critical mass at the national level.14,15  
 
Several states aim to scale the program statewide to have a significant impact on  
 
maternal and child outcomes at the population level.16 Many factors such as capacity,  
 
commitment to fidelity, sustainability over time, and ‘fit’ with local community needs  
 
affect the ability of NFP to scale up.16 Increasingly limited resources and strained  
 
capacity prohibit nonprofit organizations from scaling independently. Innovative  
 
measures that can address the needs of the population and the scarcity of funding and  
 
limited resources are needed.  
 
Government funding directed towards improving maternal and child health is  
 
allocated through Title V. Small changes can be seen in allocation amounts during the  
 
last few years. In 2010, the federal block was $662 million.17 Since then, it has  
 
fluctuated around $645 million and is proposed to be $639 million in fiscal year 2014.18  
 
While states work with the Federal government to secure funds, appropriately identify  
 
needs, and coordinate services, disparities still exist. Other funding sources are needed to  
 
tackle persisting problems. Indeed, “Despite the importance of needs assessment to  
 
MCH, the scientific knowledge base necessary to inform program leaders about the most  
 
rigorous, productive, and cost-effective approaches to address persistent need areas  
 
remains underdeveloped.” 19  
 
 Governments pose additional challenges. As Jeffrey Liebman of the Harvard  
 
Kennedy School of Government notes, governments (federal, state, and local) spend  
 
billions of dollars on social programs addressing problems, yet often the public does not  
 
know how effective these programs are at addressing the problems they are trying to  
 
eradicate.20 Performance of programs tends to be neglected while tracking the number  
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of people served is prioritized.20 For example, the Title V information system  
 
aggregates information from states about the number of people served by various Title V  
 
programs. However, the true impact of these programs is less well known. SIBs represent  
 
a potential mechanism to improve resource allocation and measure productive, proven  
 
approaches.  
 
Moreover, governments prioritize paying for inputs while budgets are built  
 
in twelve month fiscal year cycles and appropriations may vary from year to year. Often  
 
without consideration for effectiveness, governments fund the same programs from the  
 
previous year including small adjustments for inflation.20 Frequent changes in political  
 
leadership make it difficult to focus on long-term priorities. Finally, although  
 
preventative programs that could deliver large savings in the future, they are rarely a  
 
fiscal priority.  
 
 While the current need for programs is great, it comes coupled with an increase in  
 
knowledge of evidence-based programs. The past three decades saw great advances in the  
 
number of programs such as home visiting.21 Evidence-based programs are increasing  
 
in number, and organizations such as the Coalition for Evidence Based Policy seek to  
 
disseminate information about what works to affect policy choices. The Washington State  
 
Institute for Public Policy determined that “the market for rigorously researched  
 
prevention and early intervention programs is young but evolving quickly.” 22 Despite  
 
the rise in rigorous research, many of prevention-related programs have either not been  
 
sufficiently researched or do not show measureable positive effects.23 For example, in  
 
2012, of 32 home visiting models were reviewed only 12 of those met the Department of  
 
Health and Human Services standards for evidence-based models based on rigorous  
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evaluation research.24 The small number of EBP in comparison to the large number of  
 
programs in existence makes defining and ensuring the use of evidence-based program  
 
absolutely critical.  
 
 In an effort to summarize the current landscape, several conclusions must be  
 
restated. First, there are significant public health problems putting generations at risk and  
 
coming with significant social and economic burdens. Secondly, the current philanthropic  
 
and government funding streams that are used to address these problems are not  
 
adequate. The manner in which funding is administered makes it difficult for nonprofits  
 
to generate population level impact. Third, a growing research base has identified  
 
evidenced-based programs that provide solutions to these challenges. There is urgency to  
 
be both effective and accountable.   
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IV. The Social Impact Bond Structure and Players  
 
 Dramatically changing the nation’s approach and the resulting maternal and child  
 
health outcomes requires a seismic shift. Social impact bonds focus on two key elements:  
 
prevention rather than remediation and measuring outcomes rather than outputs. While  
 
far from a panacea, the concept of SIB and PFS have the potential to produce government  
 
savings, improve cross-sector collaboration, and scale effective, evidence-based  
 
programs. The intersection of public, private, and social sectors is precisely where  
 
innovation is likely to spark. Innovation is likely to lead to new ways of financing. This  
 
section will address the concept of the social impact bond and define the key terms and  
 
players involved in the contract.  
 
 Despite its moniker, the social impact bond is not a traditional bond. It is a new  
 
approach for expanding programs in which impact investors take on the financial risk of  
 
scaling up an identified program (as opposed to the government assuming this risk).  
 
While bonds are debt investments generally with fixed rates of return, the rate of return  
 
for a SIB is contingent on the success of the intervention. To avoid this confusion,  
 
governments are inclined to call these projects “pay for success” contracts.20 Though  
 
other articles point out that social impact bonds are a type of pay for success, the terms  
 
have been used synonymously.25 There exists a lack of consensus on terminology;  
 
this nascent field must clarify these terms as it gains momentum.  
 
The multi-stakeholder SIB partnership contains several key players and  
 
contractual terms. (Figure 1) It begins when government identifies a significant,  
 
recurrent, costly problem, such as recidivism or special education. With both of these  
 
examples, there are services, which if provided at the right time, could reduce or  
 
eliminate the need for costly interventions later. In the most common form of SIB, a  
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government agency (federal, state, or local) contracts with a private sector intermediary.  
 
The intermediary secures private investment funds that will pay for social services  
 
provided by a nonprofit that will help reduce future government costs. Tantamount to the  
 
program delivering results is its evidence base. Programs selected to deliver the intended  
 
services, thus far, are evidence-based programs. These programs typically have multiple  
 
rigorously conducted randomized control trials or quasi-experimental designed studies  
 
demonstrating statistically significant results. The government then pays the intermediary  
 
the cost of providing those services plus a rate of return if, and only if, the program  
 
delivers on its predetermined performance targets. If the program fails to achieve the  
 
minimum target, the government does not pay the intermediary. In the latter example, the  
 
investors who fronted the initial capital for the program lose this investment.  
 
 Two evaluators measure performance rigorously, each with a crucial role.  
 
McKinsey coined the terms “evaluation advisor” and “independent assessor” to  
 
differentiate these roles.26 The first role is more of monitoring position in which the  
 
evaluator works in an on-going relationship between the service provider and the  
 
intermediary to provide feedback. This person can help to identify mid-course changes  
 
and updates as the program is delivering services during the contract by engaging in  
 
formative or process evaluation. This evaluator is in a position to help ensure fidelity to  
 
the key components of a program and monitor how inputs are related to outcomes. The  
 
second independent evaluator assesses whether the SIB has met its performance targets at  
 
the end of the contract period. This can be viewed as an impact evaluation for shorter- 
 
term outcomes in the 4-6 year range.  
 
Intermediaries must have a broad range of skills- project management  
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capabilities, financing skills, and knowledge of social issues. Two types of organizations  
 
appear to have these skills: Social Finance US (formed to focus on SIBs) and established  
 
organizations with a range of skills.26 Social Finance is particularly well suited as a  
 
market intermediary to work collaboratively with governments, private investors, and  
 
nonprofit service providers.  The intermediary raises the revenue needed to cover  
 
operating costs to deliver the program from individual, commercial, or philanthropic  
 
investors.20 Intermediaries oversee the day-to-day operation and implementation of the  
 
project. This is a contractual relationship, as are all components of the SIB.  
 
Intermediaries also have a key role in coordinating overall project management. The  
 
intermediary manages the service provider and can select both of the evaluators. All of  
 
these stipulations are clearly stated in the contract agreement.  
 
The innovation here is in the finance model, not the program itself. Success in the  
 
PFS ecosystem has two definitions- “cost avoidance” and “outcome improvement.” 27  
 
“Costs avoided” refers to the actual reductions in government operating costs as a result  
 
of the intervention. “Outcome improvements” are measured changes in the desired  
 
directions among participants or recipients.  
 
Some purport that the concept of “paying for success” is not new in health care.28  
 
The health care industry has experimented with “value-based purchasing” whereby  
 
providers are rewarded for meeting measures of quality and efficiency.28 Results here  
 
are mixed.29 Noted barriers include insufficient measurement systems, ineffective  
 
incentive structures, unintended consequences, and added infrastructure costs.30  
 
Depending on the type of contract and outcomes targeted, these could be significant  
 
issues to consider.  
 
 
HOW DOES A SOCIAL 
IMPACT BOND WORK?
Glossary of terms
Remedial services: Government programs that address negative social outcomes after they’ve  
occurred (e.g., incarceration for criminals, emergency room access for the chronically homeless).  
Preventive interventions: Social service programs that focus on avoiding negative social outcomes  
(e.g., alternatives to incarceration, permanent supportive housing for the chronically homeless).  
Constituent treatment group: Those individuals who benefit from the preventive intervention and  
whose results are compared to others who did not receive similar services.
Evaluation adviser monitors 
ongoing progress of the 
preventive program, working 
with the intermediary and service 
providers to refine program 
based on interim results
Intermediary raises capital from 
investors; selects and manages 
nonprofit direct service providers, 
retains evaluation adviser and selects 
independent assessor; and provides 
overall SIB project management
Service providers receive 
multiyear funding from 
intermediary to deliver 
evidence-based preventive 
programs to constituent 
treatment group
Government currently 
provides costly remedial 
programs for constituents
Government contracts with intermediary 
for delivery of preventive programs to 
improve constituents’ lives, reducing 
their demand for remedial programs
Investors provide up-front 
capital to intermediary to 
pay for preventive programs; 
investors are repaid their 
capital plus a return only if 
preventive programs meet 
predetermined performance 
targets 
Independent assessor 
determines if predetermined 
performance targets are met; if 
targets are achieved, government 
repays investors with a return 
and pays a success bonus to 
intermediary and service providers
INVESTORS
GOVERNMENT
INDEPENDENT
ASSESSOR
NONPROFIT
SERVICE
PROVIDERS
EVALUATION
ADVISER
INTERMEDIARY
Preventive
programs
Remedial
programs
7
2 4
3
6
51 CONSTITUENTS
Figure 1. How does a socail impact bond work? 26
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V. Current SIB Landscape- Criteria of SIBS and Conditions for Success 
The first SIB contract was made in September of 2010 and will not return results 
until the fourth, sixth, and eight years based on the outcomes.26 In this SIB, the U.K.  
Ministry of Justice is working with Social Finance U.K. to provide services that prevent  
3,000 short-sentenced males from reoffending.20 Investors can expect to see a 7-13%  
return, depending on outcomes.20 There are several SIBs currently being tested in the  
United States. In New York City one is looking to reduce teen recidivism, and in  
Massachusetts a SIB is addressing homelessness.31 The major investors in  
this SIB are Goldman Sachs and Bloomberg. Figure 2 shows the current US SIB  
landscape.32  
FIGURE 2
U.S. progress on social impact bonds
California
• First pilot program testing feasibility 
of social impact bonds in preventive 
health
Colorado
• Received support from Harvard 
Kennedy School Social Impact Bond 
Lab, or HKS SIB Lab
Connecticut
• Passed legislation enabling the state 
to enter into social impact bond 
contracts, June 2012
• Received support from HKS SIB Lab
Illinois
• Received support from HKS SIB Lab
Maryland
• Bill introduced in House of Delegates 
to create a task force to study social 
impact bonds
Massachusetts 
• Launched social impact bond to 
reduce recidivism among juvenile 
offenders in December 2013
• Negotiating a second social impact 
bond for chronic homelessness
• Received support from HKS SIB Lab
• Passed legislation, January 2012
Michigan
• Received support from HKS SIB Lab
New York state
• Launched social impact bond to 
reduce recidivism and increase 
employment in January
• Received support from HKS SIB Lab
Sources: Sonal Shah and Kristina Costa, “Social Finance: A Primer” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2013), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/re-
port/2013/11/05/78792/social-nance-a-primer; Kristina Costa and Sam Ungar, “Social Impact Bonds Make Progress in Massachusetts, New York State” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 
forthcoming); and House Bill 2337, State of Washington, 63rd Legislature (2014), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2013-14/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/2337.pdf. 
New York City
• Launched first social impact bond 
to reduce recidivism among 
juvenile offenders in August 2012
New Jersey
• Bill in state legislature to administer 
five-year social impact bond pilot 
program and study on health care
Ohio
• Received U.S. Department of Justice 
Second Chance Act grant
• Received support from HKS SIB Lab
Oregon
• Pay-for-Success pilot included in 
governor’s 2013-2015 budget 
proposal
Pennsylvania
• Pay-for-Success legislation 
introduced in 2013
South Carolina
• Pay-for-Success legislation 
introduced in 2013
• Received support from HKS SIB Lab
Utah
• Launched social impact bond to 
fund early childhood education in 
2013
Washington, D.C.
• Issued procurement for feasibility 
study in 2013
Washington state
• Bill introduced in the House of 
Representatives to enable the use 
of social impact bonds and other 
pay-for-performance vehicles
State has an active 
social impact bond underway
State is exploring 
Pay for Success options
Figure  2  Where are social impact bonds in the U.S.? 32 
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Criteria of SIBS and Conditions for Success  
 
 McKinsey & Co. examined the benefits and requirements of successful SIBs  
 
focused on homelessness and crime prevention in the United Kingdom and assessed their  
 
applicability for the United States. The group analyzed the particular applicability of  
 
SIBs towards homelessness and crime prevention. They reported their findings in a 2012  
 
report, From Potential to Action: Bringing Social Impact Bonds to the US. Many of these  
 
issues and points of criteria will be pertinent to SIBs focused on preventative health or  
 
child outcomes.  
 
 McKinsey & Co. found that a specific set of conditions—characterizing the  
 
program area, service providers, and other nongovernmental parties to the SIB—appear  
 
to determine if SIB funding is an appropriate option. Because SIB partnerships involve a  
 
diverse set of participants including coordinating intermediaries and program assessors,  
 
they are relatively complex and expensive instruments for bringing social programs to  
 
scale.  
 
In order to attract investors, therefore:  
 
— “Current remediation costs in a program area the SIB is to address must be on a  
 
scale that makes the economic savings generated by substituting a preventive  
 
solution meaningful.  
 
— Programs to be funded by SIBs must be proven, not merely promising.  
 
• Programs should have a successful track record extending over at least five  
 
years and rigorous evaluations documenting statistically significant results.  
 
• Programs must meet the needs of a sizable population, be replicable and  
 
scalable, and be able to deliver taxpayer benefits in less than five years.  
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— Service providers (those conducting the social services) must be prepared for  
 
the special demands of SIB funding. These include:  
 
• Having a strong operating model  
 
• Having a thorough understanding of what it will take to adapt and expand the  
 
target intervention  
 
• Having experience working with partners  
 
• Having some familiarity with social impact assessment  
 
— Because they manage an SIB throughout its entire life cycle, potential  
 
intermediaries (those who coordinate the protracted implementation of the SIB)  
 
must possess:  
 
• Expertise in the relevant social issue 
 
• Financing skills  
 
• Project management abilities  
 
— Researchers note that investors will understandably be hesitant to fund an  
 
untested model of an SIB partnership. Intermediaries as a class could raise  
 
investors’ comfort level by:  
 
• Promoting SIBs that scale proven (rather than promising) interventions   
 
• Constructing SIBs in such a way that repayment is tied to the achievement of  
 
social outcomes as opposed to government savings  
 
— Both the evaluation advisor and the independent assessor must possess:  
 
• Expertise in the relevant service area  
 
• Extensive evaluation experience  
 
• A collaborative attitude  
 
18 
• Access to robust administrative data measuring the success of the program
participants and of any control group. This applies to intermediaries, as well. 
The needed data may exist in several places and data processes may be  
incompatible across units.” 26
Also, the McKinsey group summarized the conditions in which SIBs and the 
SIB process are most likely to succeed:  
1. “All stakeholders contemplating participation in an SIB must recognize
its appropriate goals and its limitations.
— SIBs are generally intended to replace more expensive, less effective remedial  
programs with less expensive, more effective preventive programs.  
— SIBs are not profit-making schemes and are therefore appropriate instruments 
for investors who have a strong interest in social betterment.  
2. Early SIB projects are likely to be unique. Flexibility and cooperation on
the part of all participants are required.
— Participants should recognize that the process of expansion entails  
encountering different conditions. Fidelity to the original concept must be  
balanced with a willingness to adapt.  
— Although flexibility is key, service providers and intermediaries will help  
ensure the development of SIB best practices by standardizing methods wherever 
possible. Intermediaries promoting SIBs can raise investors' comfort level by  
providing consistent structures and common templates.  
3. A robust education and communication plan must be executed in order to
adequately inform participants exactly what to expect from this new and 
complicated financial instrument.  
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— Intermediaries should be responsible for leading this effort, with assistance  
 
from advisers, academics, and the media.” 26  
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VI. Examples: South Carolina considers scaling Nurse Family Partnership and Utah
Preschool Program 
This particular PFS model has yet to be negotiated, however it serves as a  
potential example of how PFS will be used to improve maternal and child health  
outcomes. The Institute for Child Success is a research and policy institution aiming to  
ensure South Carolina’s children from prenatal to age five thrive in a sustainable system  
that supports their success. They purport PFS could improve the health of the state’s  
children by scaling up the proven Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP) program.33 Their  
feasibility study reveals NFP served about 568 out of 11,500 eligible high-risk mothers in 
the state in 2012. Very bluntly, ICS asserts “the state [government] simply does not have  
funds available to scale up the early childhood programs that can help prevent those  
[problems of low birth weight babies, maltreatment of children, learning disabilities, and  
crime] crises in the first place.” 33 The feasibility study concludes that PFS is a viable  
finance method to scale up the NFP program. 
Citing 5 randomized control trials proving NFP and three cost-benefit analyses,  
they argue the net societal benefits of NFP exceed its costs.33 However, in combination  
with the need and evidence base, the financing model must also be technically feasible. It 
appears several financing models involving a mix of private, philanthropic, and  
government financing are being considered with viable terms, investment and payment  
schedules and returns.33  Two intermediary organizations- Social Finance US and  Third 
Sector Capital Partners are being considered for this structure.  
Authors of the feasibility study note the difference for NFP compared to other 
PFS or SIB models. NFP does not produce outcomes in a single area. Rather, its  
attractive potential provides savings in health, special education, child welfare, and  
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criminal justice. Ergo, no single outcome can be used to determine the success of this  
 
model. The authors conclude, for South Carolina, measuring health outcomes is feasible  
 
(given the state’s current health data system), and it is simultaneously a policy priority.  
 
South Carolina has the fourth highest preterm birth rate in the United States.34 Therefore,  
 
preterm birth rates are a potential priority outcome to measure success. Other longer-term  
 
outcomes include fewer remedial education services, fewer youth crimes, and better  
 
maternal life course outcomes with increased employment and fewer closely spaced  
 
second births.33 However, the longer-term outcomes would not be used to justify the  
 
program’s success for the SIB.  
 
Although a preterm birth outcome could be measured relatively quickly (three  
 
to six months after the participant enrolls in the program), a single outcome is not enough  
 
to cover the cost of the program. The state could still choose to measure longer-term  
 
outcomes. This contract is currently being evaluated. Example figures and estimations  
 
are in the figure 3 Illustrative Term Sheet. ICS estimates that the expansion would require  
 
$24 million and would cover the cost of the 2 and half -year program of home visiting  
 
services for approximately 1,100 families per year, as well as an intermediary and  
 
evaluations.33 
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Figure 3 ICS Feasibility Study 33 
 
 While this is a very exciting opportunity, South Carolina will need to ensure all  
 
stakeholders clearly understand the outcomes and risks present in their SIB. If South  
 
Carolina chooses to use preterm birth as the outcome the program is measured by, there  
 
will need to be additional capital raised. The savings of preterm births hypothetically  
 
prevented by NFP will not be enough to cover the cost of the program. Of all the SIBs  
 
underway currently, this holds the most promise for improving both maternal and  
 
child health outcomes in both the short and long term.  
 
 Another example of PFS aimed to improve child outcomes is the Utah High  
 
Quality Preschool Program. In this SIB, high-quality preschool provided to at-risk three  
 
and four year olds is expected to prevent children from using special education and  
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remedial services in kindergarten through 12th grade.34  Goldman Sachs is loaning up  
 
to $4.6 million and J.B. Pritzker is providing $2.4 million to the United Way of Salt  
 
Lake, which is the nonprofit intermediary to oversee the daily implementation of the Utah  
 
High Quality Preschool Program in the Granite School District and the Park City School  
 
District.34 The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) will be used to serve as a  
 
measurement to determine the likelihood of a child’s use of special education services. It  
 
is assumed children testing below average will be likely to need services. Children will  
 
be tracked as they progress through the 6th grade. For each year a child does not require  
 
special education services, a re-payment will be generated. The payment is based on the  
 
fixed per annum of approximately $2,600 per student to provide special education and  
 
remedial services.34 The PFS payments will be equal to $2,470, or 95% of the per  
 
annum cost, plus an interest rate of 5.0%.34 The initial investment will enable 450-600  
 
children to attend the high-quality preschool in the fall of 2013.34 
 
 Identifying sustainable ways to improve early childhood outcomes, which will  
 
have lasting health and education effects, is important. High-quality preschool has been  
 
shown to have long term cognitive and social benefits.36-39  High quality programs  
 
typically include developmentally appropriate practices, a continuity of care, expert  
 
teachers, and family centered programs.  
 
While this model is being touted as a way to expand early education services,  
 
there are several issues with its setup and implementation to consider. First, although this  
 
center was chosen because it is high-quality, the quality of its services must be  
 
maintained and improved. The center must also be able to demonstrate which practices  
 
make it a high-quality center. Secondly, a very concerning issue with this PFS plan is the  
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potential to deny children who are in need of, and eligible for, special education services  
 
fearing that this will detract from the success of the SIB. Teachers and school  
 
administrators should not be afraid to refer children for services knowing that they are  
 
part of this cohort. Those closely involved with the implementation of this contract must  
 
be sure to document children in need of special education services appropriately receive  
 
services. Furthermore, the Utah Preschool PFS structure will have long-term implications  
 
for the K-6 school systems these children later attend. Children may be refereed for  
 
special education services once they are in elementary school, ergo services must not be  
 
denied at this level either. It is unclear how this will be ensured. Those concerned with  
 
improving early childhood outcomes will be interested in watching how Utah’s SIB  
 
progresses.  
 
 In addition to the examples in South Carolina and Utah, New York has also just  
 
released the responses to their request for PFS proposals from nonprofit organizations  
 
involved in child welfare, early childhood, healthcare, and public safety sectors. The four  
 
finalists from ten applications were: NFP, a group of healthcare nonprofits aiming to  
 
reduce diabetes for at-risk populations, Montefiore Medical Center and the Children’s  
 
Aid Society aiming to enhance school-based health centers with asthma care and  
 
pregnancy prevention services, and Hillside Children’s Center providing services for  
 
high-risk youth.40 The finalist is expected to be announced at a later date.  
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VII. SIB Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats 
 
Strengths 
 
SIBS have several attractive characteristics. First, SIBs bring the potential to scale  
 
proven programs reaching a larger population. Secondly, SIBs encourage cross-sector  
 
collaboration and innovation. The contract enables private, public, and nonprofit sectors  
 
to work closely together. Third, the risk of government funding unsuccessful programs is  
 
non-existent in this scenario. SIBs encourage investment in preventative services that  
 
work, and the government is only required to pay for them if they deliver results.  
 
Moreover, the focus on accountability and improved efficiency may spill over into  
 
other sectors.20 The use of more accountable, measured metrics may change government  
 
programs or encourage other nonprofits to focus on impact. Nonprofit organizations and  
 
funders may examine new ways to pool resources. As the McKinsey Report points out,  
 
SIBs are also attractive because they support the government’s goal of performance  
 
transformation.26 
 
The SIB structure is appealing on a more detailed level for each of the players  
 
involved for different reasons. Governments are attracted to the model primarily because  
 
it is a cost saving tool. Furthermore, it provides a more rapid way to achieve social policy  
 
goals and shifts the financial risk of ineffective programming from taxpayers to private  
 
investors. SIBs can also give the government a risk-free way to transition from paying  
 
remedial costs on the back end to less costly preventative solutions. (26) For nonprofits  
 
or service providers involved, this is an opportunity to scale effective programs and  
 
ensure stable, multi-year funding. Philanthropic investors could be attracted to this model  
 
because it provides rigorous evaluation of the initiatives they are backing and offers a  
 
way to scale them massively if they are proven to be successful.20  For participants  
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who receive the services, there are both direct tangible benefits (such as increased  
 
earnings) and other nonmonetizable returns (such as increased confidence).20 “They  
 
[SIBs] can facilitate the critical handoff from philanthropy – which provides the “risk  
 
capital” of social innovation by funding and testing new programs- to government, which  
 
has both the capital and policy influence to take programs to scale.” 26  
 
Evidence-based is often used synonymously with the terms science-based  
 
and research-based when describing programming. Various organizations use different  
 
criteria to determine if a program meets requirements for the moniker of evidence-based.  
 
For example, the Campbell Collaboration and Cochrane Collaboration aim to help health  
 
decisions be guided by an informed high-quality synthesized research base.  
 
Organizations including the Coalition for Evidence Based Policy use metrics  
 
such as “top tier” and “near top tier” to rank the evidence base for programs. The  
 
Coalition for Evidence Based Policy considers “Top Tier” evidence to include several  
 
aspects of methodologically rigorous research. First, multiple well-designed and  
 
implemented randomized control trials preferably conducted in community settings must  
 
be completed.41 These should produce “sizable, sustained benefits to participants and/or  
 
society.” 41 What defines “sizable” and “sustained” is not quantified.  Determining  
 
specific criteria for selecting and implementing programs for SIBs may be more  
 
important than the original research base. The term evidence-based must be clearly  
 
defined and supported by top quality research when constructing a SIB contract.  
 
Specific criteria defining an evidence base have yet to be stipulated for SIBs.  
 
Therefore, it is critical for funders to understand who is rating the programs and  
 
how program evidence is defined. Several similar criteria are seen in definitions of  
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evidence-based practices.  These common elements include a strong theoretical  
 
foundation, quality data collection and procedures, intended for a developmentally  
 
appropriate population, and evidence of effectiveness.23 It will be helpful for those  
 
involved in SIB constructs to define evidence-base. Figure 4 is an example of an  
 
evidence-base rating system. SIBs should aim to select programs that fit the “well- 
 
supported evidence” criteria.  
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Figure 4 The California Evidence-Based Clearinghouse Scientific Rating Scale 42
1. Well-Supported
Evidence • There is no case data suggesting a risk of harm that: a)was probably caused by the treatment and b) the harm
was severe or frequent.
• There is no legal or empirical basis suggesting that,
compared to its likely benefits, the practice constitutes
a risk of harm to those receiving it.
• The practice has a book, manual, and/or other
available writings that specify components of the
service and describe how to administer it.
• Multiple Site Replication: At least two
rigorous randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in
different usual care or practice settings have found the
practice to be superior to an appropriate comparison
practice. The RCTs have been reported in
published, peer-reviewed literature.
• In at least one RCT, the practice has shown to have a
sustained effect at least one year beyond the end of
treatment, when compared to a control group.
• Outcome measures must be reliable and valid, and
administered consistently and accurately across all
subjects.
• If multiple outcome studies have been published, the
overall weight of the evidence supports the benefit of
the practice.
2. Supported by
Research Evidence 
• There is no case data suggesting a risk of harm that: a)
was probably caused by the treatment and b) the harm
was severe or frequent.
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• There is no legal or empirical basis suggesting that, 
compared to its likely benefits, the practice constitutes 
a risk of harm to those receiving it. 
• The practice has a book, manual, and/or other available 
writings that specify the components of the practice 
protocol and describe how to administer it. 
• At least one rigorous randomized controlled trial (RCT) 
in usual care or a practice setting has found the practice 
to be superior to an appropriate comparison practice. 
The RCT has been reported in published, peer-
reviewed literature. 
• In at least one RCT, the practice has shown to have a 
sustained effect of at least six months beyond the end 
of treatment, when compared to a control group. 
• Outcome measures must be reliable and valid, and 
administered consistently and accurately across all 
subjects. 
• If multiple outcome studies have been published, the 
overall weight of evidence supports the benefit of the 
practice. 
3. Promising Research 
Evidence   • There is no case data suggesting a risk of harm that: a) was probably caused by the treatment and b) the harm 
was severe or frequent. 
• There is no legal or empirical basis suggesting that, 
compared to its likely benefits, the practice constitutes 
a risk of harm to those receiving it. 
• The practice has a book, manual, and/or other 
available writings that specify the components of the 
practice protocol and describe how to administer it. 
• At least one study utilizing some form of control 
(e.g., untreated group, placebo group, matched wait 
list study) has established the practice's benefit over 
the control, or found it to be comparable to a practice 
rated a 1, 2, or 3 on this rating scale or superior to an 
appropriate comparison practice. The study has been 
reported in published, peer-reviewed literature. 
• Outcome measures must be reliable and valid, and 
administered consistently and accurately across all 
subjects. 
• If multiple outcome studies have been conducted, the 
overall weight of evidence supports the benefit of the 
practice. 
4. Evidence Fails to 
Demonstrate Effect  • Two or more randomized controlled trials (RCTs) have found the practice has not resulted in improved 
outcomes, when compared to usual care. The studies 
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have been reported in published, peer-reviewed 
literature. 
• If multiple outcome studies have been conducted, the
overall weight of evidence does not support the 
benefit of the practice. The overall weight of evidence 
is based on the preponderance of published, peer-
reviewed studies, and not a systematic review or meta-
analysis. For example, if there have been three 
published RCTs and two of them showed the program 
did not have the desired effect, then the program 
would be rated a 4. 
5. Concerning Practice
• If multiple outcome studies have been conducted, the
overall weight of evidence suggests the intervention
has a negative effect upon clients served; and/or
• There is case data suggesting a risk of harm that: a)
was probably caused by the treatment and b) the harm
was severe or frequent; and/or
• There is a legal or empirical basis suggesting that,
compared to its likely benefits, the practice constitutes 
a risk of harm to those receiving it.
Evidence-based programs can be defined as “organized, multi-faceted  
interventions that are designed to serve consumers with complex problems…in a  
comprehensive yet individualized manner, based on a clearly articulated theory of  
change, identifications of the active agents of change, and the specification of necessary  
organizational supporters.” 43 SIBs aim to scale evidence-based programs in ways that  
have not been done in the past. Assuming nonprofits with sufficient capacity are selected, 
this will enable programs with proven effectiveness to reach larger populations.  
Another strength, which is not particularly prevalent in the SIB dialogue thus far  
is that many nonprofits value outcome or impact level evaluation yet are unable to  
complete these evaluations themselves. For example, according to the “State of  
Evaluation” which surveyed more than 600 nonprofits, outcome evaluations were rated as 
their highest priority yet according to respondents, over 80% of them cited limited staff  
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time, insufficient financial resources, and lack in-house evaluation expertise as barriers to  
 
engaging in evaluation work.44 Nonprofits in particular therefore may highly value the  
 
expertise of an independent evaluator funded by an investor.  
 
Weaknesses 
 
First, a distinction between two types of investors is necessary. Several terms  
 
have been used to describe investors. Capital for SIBs may come from private  
 
commercial entities typically more interested in returns. These “finance first” investors  
 
have yet to take on SIBs in the initial stages.45 Philanthropic investors may be more  
 
motivated by the potential to make an impact through scaling successful initiatives.  
 
One salient example is the involvement of foundations such as the Bill and Melinda  
 
Gates Foundation, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and W.K. Kellogg Foundation 
 
to scale several proven programs through the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation’s pilot 
 
aggregated growth capital fund. To date, “impact-first” investors are more likely to  
 
enter the SIB market.45 Commercial investors could be attracted to the SIB model  
 
because it offers the chance to be involved in a new market with a rate of return attached  
 
to their investment. 
 
 Critics of the SIB model cite concerns about investor priorities.46 Investors  
 
pursuing financial returns before the social benefit of a program may not have the best  
 
intentions. Again, to date, the field has mostly drawn interest from “impact investors”  
 
who have the outcome primarily in mind. This characteristic of investors may also be  
 
difficult to gauge, especially for those that are just beginning to enter the impact investing  
 
field.  
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Other major concerns surround factors affecting program implementation.  
 
Implementation has not been a focal point of the literature surround SIBs thus far. It is  
 
assumed that programs with generalizable results will fit in other settings, and under  
 
other conditions. However, this assumption will not always hold true. The program that  
 
works in one city or state may not preform the same in another place. Contextual and  
 
community factors must be considered- these will affect implementation, fit, and fidelity.  
 
Like any tool, SIBs must be applied appropriately; it may not be the most efficient or  
 
cost-effective way to scale up a given program.  
 
Moreover, the ethics behind the appeal of SIBs must be confronted. As one of the  
 
only articles on the ethics of this structure points out, the societal priorities must be  
 
considered first and foremost before investors or other players.47 The author astutely  
 
states that several questions arise such as “What is the ethical framework for choosing  
 
specific goals or setting programmatic priorities?” or, “How is one metric of success  
 
chosen over others?” 47 Several decision criteria associated with policy alternatives  
 
bear repeating here. These criteria include cost, freedom, effectiveness, equity,  
 
stigmatization, preference, autonomy, and feasibility among others.  
 
SIBs require a focus on both efficiency and equity, which will require setting  
 
priorities. Prioritizing one group or population could lead us into ethical issues  
 
concerning the equal treatment of individuals and families. SIBs may be well suited to  
 
work only with certain programs targeting specific groups- such as children or previous  
 
offenders. Additionally, attention is needed to examine the opportunity costs of selecting  
 
one goal versus another. One must consider: What approaches were not selected? Toward  
 
this end, Halpern recommends asking three questions before embarking on a SIB:  
 
1. “Is there a hidden human toll? 
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2. Are we taking the easy money rather than what is important?  
 
3. Are we using problematic means to achieve a given end?” 47 
 
Opportunities  
 
An exhaustive list of SIB applications has yet to be explored. Currently, it  
 
appears that SIBs are particularly well matched to programs that are effective in  
 
promoting behavior change. Other interventions that require expanding access to  
 
products such as bed nets tend to be more market-orientated and may not fit this model.  
 
Perhaps the greatest potential of SIBs is the opportunity they bring for cross sector  
 
collaboration.  
  
 SIBs have a unique opportunity to change the way proven EBPs are scaled.  
 
For example, some foundations may see SIBs as a new opportunity to improve the  
 
public sector’s allocation of resources.48 The new variations of SIBs are an  
 
additional opportunity. One such example is known as a “Health Impact Bond.”  
 
Examples of Opportunities with Adapted SIB models: Health Impact Bonds  
 
 A two-year project in Fresno, California is paving the way for the first health  
 
impact bond. The results of this initial experiment are something to watch for. Collective  
 
Health partnered with Social Finance US to target asthma-related emergency department  
 
costs. The prevalence of asthma in Fresno is significant; nearly 20 percent of children  
 
ages 5-17 have been diagnosed with it.49 Two providers, the Central California  
 
Asthma Collaborative and Clinica Sierra Vista will work with 200 low-income children  
 
and their families delivering home care, education, and support to reduce the  
 
environmental causes and triggers of asthma.50 This is just one example highlighting  
 
the type of proof-of-concept projects that are likely to be born out of the social impact  
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bond space. It will chart the way for future health specific SIB bonds.50 
 
The combination of accountability tied to outcomes with a return on investment is  
 
a new approach. Other variations linking funding with outcomes in innovative methods  
 
are likely to immerge from this space.  
 
Threats  
 
 Before jumping in head first, one must consider potential threats accompanying a  
 
SIB structure. SIBs cannot be viewed as a substitute for government services. Just  
 
because a SIB is in place in one area does not relieve the government from providing  
 
social services. Although SIBs may offer a longer financing period for some nonprofits,  
 
depending on the timing of the contract, there may still be a risk of discontinuing services  
 
in relation to the temporary nature of the funding. Political threats may include changing  
 
administrations and legislative effects. Moreover, there is a significant need for  
 
standardization.  
 
 There may also be significant issues with vulnerabilities related to measurement  
 
and the capacity to produce the rigorous evaluations required by the current SIB  
 
structure. Third party evaluators will need to be available to complete the evaluations  
 
required by a SIB contract.  
 
 Another major factor contributing to the success of future SIBs is the capacity of  
 
nonprofits selected to participate. Nonprofits must be large enough to have the human  
 
capital and resources necessary to scale at the level required by such a contract. Smaller  
 
nonprofits without proven results, or which do not use EBP, will find themselves  
 
overlooked in this process. Conversely, the construction of SIBs may encourage some  
 
nonprofits to refine their measurement and evaluation practices.  
  
The priorities and value propositions of each stakeholder may be at odds, as one  
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“Investor Landscape” paper notes.48 Authors of this paper utilized extensive interviews  
 
with investors in the SIB space to reach several conclusions. Investors may find their  
 
priorities at odds with those of the government and service providers. Specifically, “Some  
 
investors fear a public backlash against what the public could perceive as the government  
 
paying a premium for ‘outsourcing’ social programs. Counterparty risk (seen in figure 5)  
 
will be significantly mitigated through legislative or executive action to secure the long- 
 
term contingent liability to investors.” 48 They developed eight themes from talking with  
 
commercial investors. The authors argue that investor participation in SIB discussions is  
 
contingent on how well these challenges are addressed.48  
 
 
36 
Figure 5 Value Proposition by Stakeholder 48
Dark Blue: positive, sea blue: negative, light blue: neutral 
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VIII. Recommendations  
 
The maternal and child health practice should continue to be evidence-based,  
 
relying on scientifically rigorous and defensible data to improve accountability. The  
 
energizing momentum of SIBs will bring new innovations to the forefront. The first step  
 
in pursing a SIB is a feasiblity study. If a SIB has potential to improve outcomes in one’s  
 
area, state or local governments should be encouraged to pursue a feasbility study. MCH  
 
professionals can also contribute by addressing the need for rigorous monitoring and  
 
evalution measures. 
 
 MCH montioring and evaluation professionals may have an important role to play  
 
in several of these new structures. As new contracts are considered, those invovled  
 
should raise issues and questions to teams considering PFS as a mechanism to improve  
 
maternal and child health outcomes. It will be crucial to define clear outcomes and  
 
performance measures. The measures must be collectable, objective, and tied to the  
 
desirable social goal. Data collection and sharing methods will also be important. If there  
 
are multiple providers, all parties must understand what data is being collected, have  
 
access to the data, and understand how data are linked to incentives and penalties.  
 
The details of future contracts will be tantamount to the success of SIBs and PFS  
 
partnerships aimed at improving maternal and child health.  
 
 There are also significant human capital needs in order to successfully operate a  
 
PFS structure. Scaling up nonprofits and expanding services to large numbers of  
 
constituents will require capacity building in many smaller to mid size nonprofit  
 
organizations. Capacity building, and the potential for growing, will be an important  
 
piece to consider before beginning a contract. Furthermore, there is a need for  
 
independent third party evaluators in the PFS structure.  
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 Finally, as almost any incentive system will produce unintended consequences, it  
 
will be critical to identify and fix ways parties may be trying to game the system. Those  
 
who work with providers and know the details about timing and coding for specific  
 
measures must be diligent. The incentive structure should be kept separate from the  
 
basic costs of delivering services.  
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IX. Conclusion  
 
 The SIB ecosystem is evolving rapidly. It will change and develop as the first few  
 
SIBs report their outcomes, successes, and challenges. Public health problems posing  
 
signficiant costs must continue to be targeted. The social impact bond structure is one  
 
innovative way to address these problems. As a multi-stakeholder agreement, the SIB  
 
structure involves investors, intermediaries, nonprofit service providers, and the  
 
government to scale needed programs that improve outcomes for the beneficiaries and  
 
society.  
 
After a review of the social impact bond landscape to date, social impact bonds  
 
hold a great deal of potential to improve maternal and child outcomes. However, SIBs  
 
and PFS involve complex contracts and significant costs. In order for them to be  
 
effective, stakeholders must be engaged and able to address the need for shared  
 
accountability and clarity of outcomes. This type of structure may not be a good fit for all  
 
communities. Their success will hinge on the exact contracts and detailed outcomes laid  
 
forth by those pioneering the new mechanism. This new model is likely to spur capacity  
 
building, innovation, and rigorous evaluation which will in turn also benefit the field.  
 
 
 
“We have a chance to break away from decades of relative stagnation, and to transform  
 
the way the government funds many of the most vital social services in this country. Not  
 
only will taxpayers feel less burdened, but our most vulnerable communities may at long  
 
last begin to rise on the same tide that has lifted so many others to such great heights.” 51 
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